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ABSTRACT  
   
This study investigates the relation between the line of service (audit, tax, 
advisory) of Big Four office managing partners (OMPs) and both non-audit service fees 
and audit quality. Given that audit quality has been shown to vary across offices and 
because changes in office-level leadership can impact the office culture, I examine the 
impact of the OMP’s line of service on non-audit service fees and audit quality. I find 
that when an accounting firm office changes leadership to an advisory OMP, non-audit 
service revenues increase while audit quality suffers. This finding is consistent with 
advisory partners encouraging an office culture that emphasizes selling non-audit services 
more than conducting quality audits. Overall, this study provides evidence consistent 
with regulators’ concerns that the recent trend toward greater advisory services at the 
largest accounting firms reduces their focus on providing high-quality audits, thereby 
leading to decreased audit quality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Big Four accounting firm offices generally provide three primary services: audit, 
tax, and advisory. For any individual office, top management can place relatively more or 
less emphasis on each of these lines of service. In doing so, office leaders exhibit a “tone 
at the top” through their communication of policies and procedures, compliance 
expectations, rewards systems, and the example set through their behavior (TAC 2007; 
PCAOB 2013a). While office-level management has a responsibility to disseminate 
organizational goals, these leaders can intentionally or unintentionally promote the norms 
of their functional area when communicating information to the local office. Wyatt 
(2004) and Hermanson (2009) suggest that these norms differ by functional area and, 
more specifically, that a culture shaped by an individual from the advisory function can 
potentially de-emphasize audit quality in favor of commercialism. Thus, I investigate 
whether a change in the office-level leadership of accounting firms influences non-audit 
services (NAS) and audit quality. Specifically, I examine whether the line of service (i.e., 
audit, tax, or advisory) in which an office managing partner (OMP) operates impacts non-
audit service revenues and the quality of audits delivered by that office. 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has raised concerns 
about the recent growth in advisory services, now the largest source of revenue for the 
Big Four accounting firms, and argues that this trend could lead to a decline in audit 
quality (PCAOB 2014b, 2015a). Failing to support these concerns, Lisic, Myers, 
Pawlewicz, and Seidel (2015) find that higher advisory revenues at the audit firm level 
does not impair audit quality. In contrast, Beardsley, Lassila, and Omer (2015) focus on 
  2 
the effect of declining audit fees at the office-level and find that increased NAS result in 
lower audit quality, but only in the presence of audit fee pressures. Extending this 
research, I identify a setting in which an increase in NAS is likely to be observed and 
examine the corresponding impact on audit quality. I test whether a change in office-level 
tone at the top affects both the revenues generated from NAS and the quality of the audits 
provided. In doing so, I investigate the global chairman of PwC’s statement that “culture 
is key to ensuring consulting does not harm audit quality” (Shubber 2015, ¶ 12). I use a 
change in the OMP’s line of service as my variable of interest and provide evidence on 
one potential underlying mechanism (i.e., tone at the top) that shifts auditors’ focus away 
from providing high-quality audits. In doing so, I remove noise inherent in utilizing 
measures of non-audit services alone as these services can be provided by personnel in 
any of the audit, tax, or advisory functions.
1
  
Regulators have defined tone at the top to include a broad list of considerations 
such as policies, procedures, expectations, and incentives (TAC 2007, PCAOB 2013a).
2
 
Irrespective of the definition utilized, regulators have identified tone at the top to be a key 
indicator of the incentives that drive auditors to provide quality audits and one which can 
emphasize the auditor’s responsibility to investors through accountability and adherence 
to professional standards (CAQ 2014, 2016). Consistent with this incentive definition, 
contracting theory and principal-agent models popularized by Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1987, 1991) suggest that employees will engage in the activities that maximize their 
                                                 
1
 For example, the audit function can provide employee benefit plan audits and the tax function can provide 
tax planning services which are both categorized as non-audit services when provided to audit clients. 
 
2
 Other considerations include culture, organizational environment, strategy, and norms that govern the 
practice. 
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utility function whether incentivized through explicit forms of compensation or social 
norms. They propose that employees perform activities for which they are more heavily 
compensated which leads to a reallocation of effort to these tasks (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991). Because accounting firms are organized into local offices, a change in 
the OMP’s line of service impacts the tone of messages communicated to partners and 
employees within that office. Further, the OMP’s functional background will impact 
his/her focus and potentially affect the office’s emphasis on providing high-quality 
audits. Given the desire of audit personnel to maximize personal wealth, I build on the 
propositions of Wyatt (2004) and propose that changing to an advisory OMP increases 
the influence of individuals that have a more limited understanding of the importance of 
audit quality. As such, when an office changes to an advisory OMP, audit personnel can 
be motivated to conform to the norms of the advisory practice, increasing their focus on 
selling non-audit services relative to audit quality. Thus, changing to an advisory OMP 
may impact the culture, business strategy, and behaviors of audit personnel within the 
office. 
Any change in the office culture attributable to an advisory OMP must overcome 
multiple levels of oversight and ex post review in order to impact audit quality. 
Specifically, auditing standards require key judgments and critical audit areas to be 
reviewed by a second partner who has no direct client involvement. Also, audit firms 
conduct their own internal quality control reviews, have AICPA-sponsored peer reviews, 
and are subject to PCAOB inspections on their audits of public clients. Furthermore, 
irrespective of a cultural shift, audit partners may maintain their focus on performing 
high-quality audits to minimize reputation concerns and financial penalties.  
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Although audit partners are heavily incentivized to conduct quality audits, there 
are a number of reasons that changing to an advisory OMP can decrease their focus on 
audit quality. An emphasis on the advisory function can distract employees away from 
audit quality in favor of promoting NAS, explicitly or implicitly change employee 
evaluation and promotion criteria, and lead to independence impairment (PCAOB 
2015a). In addition, advisory OMPs also have less personal regulatory exposure and a 
more limited understanding of regulatory risks than audit OMPs, which makes them less 
proficient in their management of audit personnel. Thus, based on the propositions of 
Wyatt (2004) and Hermanson (2009), I expect that offices changing to an advisory OMP 
will place less emphasis on audit quality relative to more compliance oriented non-
advisory OMPs from the audit or tax practice.
3
 Consequently, I anticipate that auditors 
will respond to the incentives promoted by the OMP leading to an increase in NAS fees 
and a decrease in audit quality for offices that change to an advisory OMP.
4
 
To test the impact of a change in tone at the top on non-audit service revenues and 
audit quality, I hand-collect background information for OMPs at the Big Four 
accounting firms for 2003-2011 and identify each OMP’s line of service (i.e., audit, tax, 
or advisory). Consistent with the trends suggested by regulators, I find that the proportion 
of advisory OMPs increases over the sample period from 12.5% in 2003 to 23.2% in 
                                                 
3
 Although tax partners can engage in both compliance and advising services (e.g., auditing the tax 
provision and tax planning, respectively), I have identified them as more compliance oriented non-advisory 
OMPs. For robustness, I drop all observations identified as a change to or from a tax OMP and find all 
inferences remain unchanged.  
 
4
 Although the opposite prediction could be made for changes from advisory to non-advisory OMPs, the 
sample size for this group of changes was prohibitive in drawing inferences for those observations. In 
untabulated tests, these results are generally insignificant with the exception of both fee models which were 
consistent with expectations. Furthermore, to ensure my results are not driven by the inclusion of advisory 
to non-advisory OMP changes in the “other changes” sample I exclude these observations and find 
inferences remain unchanged. 
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2011. I next employ a difference-in-difference research design that compares changes in 
NAS fees and audit quality (i.e., going-concern reporting, restatements, and discretionary 
accruals) for an office that changes from a non-advisory to an advisory OMP relative to 
other changes in OMP. In utilizing a difference-in-difference analysis of only offices with 
OMP changes, I am able to better identify the effect of a change to an advisory OMP 
because this design limits concerns of omitted variables and selection bias (Hail and Leuz 
2009; DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li 2015). Furthermore, additional tests provide little 
evidence that changes in OMP are associated with my dependent variables, office 
revenues and audit quality, suggesting the decision to change OMP is influenced by 
factors beyond office strategy alone. Lastly, in untabulated analyses, I utilize a second 
benchmark group of offices that do not change OMP to provide further evidence that the 
associations I find are distinct from the overall trends in the audit profession. 
Prior to examining associations with audit quality, I first evaluate whether 
switching to an advisory OMP is associated with a change in office culture. Given my 
expectation that advisory OMPs are more focused on promoting NAS and less focused on 
audit quality relative to non-advisory OMPs, I predict that offices that change from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs will have an increase in NAS fees relative to other offices. 
Correspondingly, because audit fees have been used to proxy for audit effort (Hogan and 
Wilkins 2008; Rice and Weber 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013), this proposition also 
suggests offices that change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs have a non-positive 
association with audit fees relative to other offices. Consistent with expectations, I find 
an incremental increase in NAS fees for offices that change from a non-advisory to 
advisory OMP relative to other offices, with no corresponding association between 
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changes in audit fees. These results provide support for my proposition that switching to 
an advisory OMP promotes a culture that is more likely to emphasize selling NAS 
relative to other OMP changes. 
Moreover, consistent with expectations, I find that changes from non-advisory to 
advisory OMPs are associated with incremental decreases in audit quality relative to 
other changes in OMP. I follow the suggestions of DeFond and Zhang (2014) and utilize 
multiple measures of audit quality (i.e., going-concern reporting, restatements, and 
discretionary accruals) in order to draw stronger inferences. I find that the decrease in 
going concern report issuance is greater for audit offices that change to an advisory OMP. 
Further, the likelihood of egregious (i.e., fraud-related) misstatements incrementally 
increases for offices that switch to advisory OMPs. Lastly, I find a greater increase in the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals among clients from offices that change to an 
advisory OMP. Overall, these findings provide evidence that offices which change from 
non-advisory to advisory OMPs exhibit incremental increases in NAS fees and 
incremental decreases in audit quality relative to other offices. 
My study contributes to the auditing literature and has implications for accounting 
firms and regulators. Specifically, this study is the first to examine whether the line of 
service of the OMP impacts non-audit service revenues and the quality of audits 
delivered by their office. The results suggest that while accounting firm offices that 
switch to an advisory OMP enjoy increases in NAS revenues from their audit clients, the 
quality of audits suffer. This provides evidence that tone at the top likely underlies 
variation in auditors’ focus on providing high-quality audits. These findings inform 
regulators as to the validity of their concerns with regard to the rise of advisory services 
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at the largest audit firms (PCAOB 2014a) and are potentially supportive of regulator 
efforts to have “audit only” service providers (EC 2010). Considering that the PCAOB is 
currently investigating the validity of empirical indicators of audit quality, this study also 
identifies a clear “tone at the top” indicator measured at the audit office-level, the OMP’s 
line of service (PCAOB 2013b).
5
 Lastly, as one of the first archival studies to examine 
the association between audit office tone at the top and audit quality, this study answers a 
call for future research on audit firm culture (Jenkins, Deis, Bedard, and Curtis 2008). 
                                                 
5
 In their recent concept release on audit quality indicators, the PCAOB acknowledged that analyses based 
on office-level characteristics and experience may be important to discussions of tone at the top (PCAOB 
2015b).  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background on Advisory Services 
After notable accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) set regulations in place to restrict non-audit services. Specifically, SOX prohibits 
the provision of certain NAS to audit clients in an effort to enhance auditor 
independence. Although SOX has somewhat diminished auditor’s reliance on NAS, these 
services still remain a substantial portion (21%) of the revenues that auditors receive 
from their audit clients (Whalen, McCoy, and Hannen 2014). Moreover, SOX does not 
regulate the provision of advisory services to non-audit clients which has provided an 
opportunity for accounting firms to continue growing this business. Raising concerns, 
advisory service fees for the U.S. Big Four firms totaled 39% of revenues in 2013 relative 
to only 36% for audit fees (PCAOB 2014a).
6
 Hermanson (2009, 8) states that if the 
advisory function generates a large portion of firm revenue, then it may have enough 
power to “drive the firm’s culture toward commercialism and away from accounting 
professionalism.” Accordingly, the PCAOB is troubled by what this trend signals about 
the culture for these firms and its potential impact on audit quality. Specifically, 
regulators are concerned that an emphasis on advisory services will distract firm leaders 
away from audit quality, potentially change employee performance measurement to 
emphasize new business, lead to independence impairment, and create conflicts between 
the audit and advisory practices (PCAOB 2014b, 2015a). 
                                                 
6
 Concurrent with this growth in advisory revenues, the Big Four firms have acquired a number of advisory 
firms (Sorkin 2009; De La Merced and Norris 2013) and more recently, KPMG promoted to CEO its 
former head of the firm’s advisory practice (Rapoport 2015).  
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Although regulators have called attention to changes in culture concurrent with 
the rise in advisory services at accounting firms, much of the research to date has focused 
on the impact that non-audit services have on audit quality. Early research investigates 
the impact of NAS on audit quality at the client level through the lenses of knowledge 
spillover and independence impairment, providing mixed evidence (e.g., DeFond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Kinney, Palmrose, 
and Scholz 2004; Reynolds, Deis, and Francis 2004; Nam and Ronen 2012; Koh, 
Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2013). More recent research by Beardsley et al. (2015) and 
Lisic et al. (2015) examine the provision of NAS at the office-level and audit firm-level, 
respectively. Beardsley et al. (2015) analyze how audit offices respond when 
experiencing audit fee pressure. They find that audit offices increase NAS to offset lost 
audit revenues and that these increases in NAS only lead to a decline in audit quality 
when the audit firm is experiencing audit fee pressure. In contrast, Lisic et al. (2015) find 
no evidence that higher advisory revenues at the firm level impairs audit quality. Thus, 
these two studies further contribute to the mixed results. 
A potential reason for this overall mixed evidence is that this research generally 
focuses on the provision of non-audit services as the catalyst to a change in audit quality 
and thus does not investigate changes to organizational culture that underlie an emphasis 
on NAS. Furthermore, the majority of this research fails to identify the operational level 
at which regulators concerns are prone to exist (i.e., the office-level). Although I take a 
similar approach to Beardsley et al. (2015) in testing my research question at the office-
level, I differ from their study by focusing on how the functional area of office-level 
leadership as a proxy for tone at the top impacts audit quality. In doing so, I move beyond 
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the examination of when NAS lead to a decline in audit quality and instead provide 
evidence on one potential underlying mechanism that shifts auditors’ focus away from 
providing high-quality audits. 
Office-Level Leadership and Tone at the Top 
Prior research suggests that decision making typically occurs at the local office-
level for Big Four firms (e.g, Wallman 1996; Francis, Stokes, and Anderson 1999). 
Specifically, contracting with clients, hiring and staffing decisions, and the signing of the 
audit opinion are generally managed by the local office. Testimonies during the trial of 
Arthur Andersen even detailed how the Houston office disregarded and sometimes 
misrepresented advice from the national professional standards group at Andersen’s 
headquarters (Schmidt 2002). Although the Enron scandal represents a single occurrence, 
Krishnan (2005) provides evidence that Andersen’s Houston clients, on average, 
displayed lower financial reporting quality suggesting that the culture of the office may 
have been compromised. Furthermore, Jenkins et al. (2008) use Andersen’s Houston 
office as a prime example to suggest that culture may differ across individual offices of 
large audit firms, and this is particularly relevant to my study as the OMP of the Houston 
office was an advisory partner (Batson, Enron Corp., and United States 2003). 
Recent research has also shown the importance of office-level characteristics in 
examining audit quality and indicates that there are office-level differences in employee 
skills and expertise as well as corresponding variation in client portfolios (e.g., Francis 
and Yu 2009; Francis and Michas 2013; Francis, Michas, and Yu 2013). Given this 
variation in skills and expertise, it is not uncommon for offices to emphasize any one of 
the services they offer (e.g., audit, tax, or advisory). Moreover, the OMP’s functional 
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background will likely impact his/her communications and thus can influence the 
auditors’ attention toward performing high-quality audits. This should not be cause for 
concern however, as the global chairman of PwC recently stated that, “if the culture of 
the firm does not provide the glue that allows all the different capabilities [lines of 
service] to coexist under the same umbrella then I think you have some real issues” 
(Shubber 2015, ¶ 12). Thus, this study is the first to investigate how the tone at the top 
offered by the OMP impacts audit quality, even when they often have no direct impact on 
audit engagements, which is especially true of advisory OMPs. 
Hypothesis Development 
Contracting theory suggests that audit firm partners and employees have monetary 
and social incentives to take actions that will draw support from their OMP. Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1987, 1991) suggest that employees will engage in activities to maximize 
their utility function. Specifically, their works suggest that employees perform tasks for 
which they are provided greater compensation which can lead to a reallocation of effort 
to those activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). Given this literature, it is important to 
understand whether the compensation method of audit firms makes audit personnel 
susceptible a change in the culture of the local office when changing to an advisory OMP. 
Although an OMP generally has no direct impact on audit engagements,
7
 their functional 
background can influence the culture of the office including performance incentives and 
risk preferences.  
                                                 
7
 I acknowledge that an audit OMP can directly impact audit engagements for which he/she is in charge; 
however, these engagements only represent a small portion of the total audit engagements for which the 
office is responsible. 
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Prior research has engaged auditors in surveys and interviews (e.g., Trompeter 
1994; Burrows and Black 1996) and more recently, gained access to proprietary records 
in understanding the compensation method of audit firms (Knechel, Niemi, and Zerni 
2013). Trompeter (1994) finds that audit firms emphasize local office profitability in 
compensating partners while Burrows and Black (1996) find that partners share profits 
from all lines of service (audit, tax, and advisory).
8
 Using Swedish data, Knechel et al. 
(2013) find that partner compensation is associated with a combination of audit firm 
level, office-level, and partner specific characteristics with acquisition of new business 
exhibiting a positive association with partner compensation. Although these studies span 
different regulatory regimes and time periods, their results are largely consistent with the 
anecdotal evidence from Byrnes (2007) which states that Deloitte compensates partners 
from one profit pool across all lines of service, and thus audit partners benefit indirectly 
from the provision of NAS.  
While monetary incentives alone are likely sufficient to motivate audit partners to 
promote non-audit services, research also suggests that the desire to conform to social 
norms can sufficiently incentivize auditors at all levels of the firm. Specifically, 
Prendergast (1993, 1999) incorporates the desire to conform into the principal-agent 
model and finds that subjective evaluation in the context of promotions can motivate 
employees to engage in behaviors that draw the support of their supervisors. Drawing 
from this work, Fischer and Huddart (2008) develop a principal-agent model for a 
professional organization in which peer-established social norms influence the behavior 
                                                 
8
 More recently, Coram (2015) complements these results in finding that Big Four firms compensate 
partners from profit pools based on their personal level of performance measured by fees, new clients, and 
contribution to practice. 
  13 
of individuals and suggest that public accounting firms are a prime example. The authors 
acknowledge that a social norm for high audit quality will influence partners to 
emphasize audit quality even if revenues are the primary performance measure. In 
contrast, if social norms instead discount audit quality (e.g., under an advisory OMP), 
then revenues will be promoted while audit quality suffers. 
Correspondingly, there a number of reasons that changing to an advisory OMP 
will increase an office’s emphasis on non-audit services and potentially detract from audit 
quality. First, given their personal incentives, advisory OMPs are more likely than their 
non-advisory counterparts to promote the selling of NAS which could distract audit 
partners from their core audit responsibility (Byrnes 2007; Fischer and Huddart 2008). 
Second, advisory OMPs can explicitly or implicitly change employee performance 
measurement and promotion criteria to emphasize new business (Hermanson 2009; 
McKenna 2011). Third, advisory OMPs can give preference to personnel that operate in 
or promote their line of service which can affect staffing or hiring practices (Wyatt 2004). 
Fourth, advisory OMPs have a more limited understanding about the regulatory risks that 
audit partners face and thus are less proficient in their management of audit personnel. 
Lastly, advisory OMPs have less personal regulatory exposure making them less 
concerned with risks of audit failure and PCAOB sanctions (Dey, Robin, and Tessoni 
2012). Following the implications of contracting theory, audit partners and employees 
have incentives to curry favor with their local OMP. Consequently, changing to an 
advisory OMP, audit personnel are more likely to allow the provision of NAS at their 
audit clients. Thus, I present my first hypothesis, as follows: 
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H1: Changing to an advisory OMP is positively associated with changes in 
non-audit fees. 
Consistent with the above arguments, audit partners and employees are also more 
likely to allow audit quality to diminish, whether intentionally or unintentionally, when 
changing to an advisory OMP. Thus, I present my second hypothesis, as follows: 
H2: Changing to an advisory OMP is negatively associated with changes 
in audit quality. 
Although changing to an advisory OMP may impact office culture, the accounting 
firm is required by regulators to observe certain quality control mechanisms which 
govern the audit profession. Specifically, auditing standards require key judgments and 
critical audit areas to be reviewed by a second partner who has no direct client 
involvement. Also, audit firms conduct their own internal quality control reviews, have 
AICPA-sponsored peer reviews, and are subject to PCAOB inspections on their audits of 
public clients. Moreover, there are additional reasons that changing to an advisory OMP 
may not impact audit quality or the provision of NAS. First, although changing to an 
advisory OMP does exert some influence over office culture, audit engagement partners 
may reject the increased emphasis on NAS revenues to minimize reputation concerns and 
financial penalties. Second, given that SOX limited the types of NAS which can be 
provided to audit clients, it may be that audit partners are already permitting an 
appropriate level of NAS at their clients. Lastly, advisory OMPs may not differ from 
audit OMPs in their desire to provide high-quality audits as a failure to do so could be 
detrimental to future audit and non-audit business. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVES 
Sample Selection 
To construct my sample, I hand collect background data on office managing 
partners for each of the Big Four audit firms during the period from 2003-2011. Focusing 
on this time period allows me to ensure that the sample includes the additional regulatory 
and reporting requirements imposed by SOX while also allowing sufficient time for 
restatement disclosures. I utilize a social networking site for professionals to obtain OMP 
information for 287 of the 390 Big Four auditor-office locations as identified in the Audit 
Analytics population.
9
 To mitigate concerns over the reliability of this data, I examine 
alternative data sources (e.g., local industry journals and state CPA society press releases) 
to substantiate the information for each OMP. In doing so, these sources allow me to 
identify and/or verify the effective date of the OMP’s appointment, the individual they 
succeeded, the line of service in which they operate, and limited information describing 
their previous experience.
10
 I then utilize an iterative process to collect the same 
characteristics for each preceding OMP, where these individuals are identifiable. 
Appendix A details the hand collection process, providing examples of information from 
both data sources. 
Pairing with the audit office data from Audit Analytics, my initial sample includes 
783 unique auditor-city-OMP observations with roughly equal representation of each 
                                                 
9
 I recognize that some audit offices represent small satellite office locations or regional groupings in which 
the OMP resides in another location (e.g., Dayton, OH is sometimes a satellite office for Cincinnati, OH). 
In an untabulated analysis, I drop observations for satellite offices and find all inferences remain 
unchanged. 
 
10
 The press releases improve the accuracy of the effective date of the OMP’s appointment as the social 
networking site does not always delineate the years in which each job title is held. 
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audit firm (i.e., between 23.6% and 29.0%). For each OMP, I identify the line of service 
in which they operate in order to develop my key variable of interest, as well as, other 
individual characteristics which may impact audit quality in their office (e.g., number of 
years as OMP, number of years as partner, etc.). Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics for other OMP characteristics at the auditor-city-OMP level showing that 
advisory OMPs are longer tenured partners and more likely to be female than non-
advisory OMPs. In addition, Table 1, Panel B provides more detail of the raw annual 
frequency of unique auditor-city-OMP-years partitioned by their line of service. Figure 1 
plots the proportions of audit, tax, and advisory OMPs for the Big Four firms from 2003 
through 2011. While the percentage of audit partners holds relatively constant between 
65% and 70% for the entire period, the trends for advisory and tax partners show 
meaningful changes. Specifically, the proportion of OMPs identified as advisory partners 
increases from 12.5% in 2003 to 23.2% in 2011 while the proportion of tax partners 
decreases from 19.3% to 10.8%.
11
 
Within this initial sample of auditor-city-OMP-years, I identify 165 changes in 
OMP of which 34 (20.6%) represent changes from a non-advisory OMP to an advisory 
OMP while 131 (79.4%) represent other changes in OMP.
12
 In limiting the sample to 
only offices with a change in OMP, the difference-in-difference design provides a 
stronger test by holding constant unobserved attributes specific to offices where a change 
in OMP occurs. Table 2, Panel A describes how I arrive at the final sample for each 
                                                 
11
 Slight variation across these groupings was observed when analyzing each Big Four firm separately. 
Specifically, the greatest aggregate percentage of advisory OMPs was 24% while the lowest was 11%, 
respectively. 
  
12
 Of these other changes in OMP, 13 (7.9%) represent changes from an advisory to a non-advisory OMP, 5 
(3.0%) represent changes between advisory OMPs, and 113 (68.5%) represent changes between non-
advisory OMPs. 
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regression model. First, I identify 8,541 client-year observations for years -2 to +2 
surrounding the year of OMP change.
13
 After dropping all changes in OMP which do not 
have at least two full years between OMP changes, the sample is reduced to 8,068 
observations for 147 OMP changes. This requirement ensures no overlap in client-year 
observations when subsequently requiring at least one year in both the pre- and post-
change periods. I then drop 1,612 observations for the year the OMP change occurs (Year 
0) in order to remove any concerns related to differences in the timing of the change 
during the fiscal year by completely delineating between years in which the predecessor 
and successor OMPs managed the office. Arriving at a sample of 6,456 observations, I 
further limit the sample for each of my dependent variables separately to ensure that I 
have the necessary Compustat financial data, CRSP returns data, Audit Analytics fee and 
reporting data, and Thomson Reuters institutional holdings data. After removing client-
year observations that do not have the required data, I delete all observations for clients 
without at least one observation in both the pre- and post-OMP change periods to 
mitigate concerns that results are due to differences in client portfolios. These 
requirements result in final samples of 2,777 observations for non-audit fee regressions, 
2,623 for going concern reporting regressions, 3,335 for restatement regressions, and 
3,381 observations for discretionary accrual regressions. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Table 2, Panel B describes the annual frequency of OMP changes included in my 
discretionary accruals sample as well as the proportion of changes which represent a 
                                                 
13
 In untabulated tests, I limit the sample to only the year immediately before (-1) and after (+1) the year of 
OMP change and find inferences remain unchanged with the exception of regressions for nasfees and 
abs_dacc where the coefficients for non_to_adv*post are directionally consistent but fall out of 
significance due to a reduction in power.  
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change from a non-advisory OMP to an advisory OMP. Approximately 21% of the 
changes in OMP are categorized as a change from a non-advisory to an advisory OMP 
with that percentage ranging from 12% to 41% over the period of the sample. The high 
percentage in 2007 may coincide with audit firms anticipating increased fee pressures 
during the recession years and therefore, compensating by increasing their emphasis on 
provision of NAS as suggested in Beardsley et al. (2015). Furthermore, this table also 
describes the annual frequency of client-year observations and the proportion of 
observations associated with offices that change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs. 
Based on my sample construction procedures and the choice to exclude the OMP change 
year, it is unsurprising that approximately 23% of the sample relates to changes from 
non-advisory to advisory OMPs with the largest proportion of those observations 
occurring in 2005-2009. 
Sample Descriptives 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics in the pre- and post-change periods for non-
advisory to advisory OMP changes and other changes in OMP, along with differences in 
means between the pre- and post-change periods. For both types of OMP changes, NAS 
fees are not significantly different (p > 10%) between the pre- and post-change periods. 
Though not significant, these findings are directionally consistent with H1 as NAS fees 
are increasing from the pre- to post-change period for non-advisory to advisory OMP 
changes while decreasing for other changes in OMP. With respect to H2, I find that audit 
quality, as measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (abs_dacc) and 
negative discretionary accruals (neg_dacc), decreases from the pre to post period (p < 
10%) for clients of offices that change from a non-advisory to advisory OMP while not 
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significantly different for other OMP change offices. Additionally, I find that audit 
quality, as measured by going concern reporting (gc) and egregious restatements 
(restate_egreg), increases from the pre to post period (p < 1%) for clients of offices with 
other OMP changes while not significantly different for offices that change from a non-
advisory to advisory OMP. Given these results, I find that the mean difference-in-
difference values for abs_dacc, neg_dacc, and restate_egreg (untabulated) are significant 
suggesting that clients of offices that change from a non-advisory to advisory OMP 
experience a greater decrease in audit quality relative to clients of offices with other OMP 
changes. Lastly, among the control variables, clients of offices that change from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs experience a greater decrease in the likelihood that they are 
audited by a local industry expert as well as greater increases in the likelihood of material 
weakness and prior year restatements relative to clients of offices with other OMP 
changes.  
In analyzing whether these and, subsequent, multivariate findings are due to 
differences between the treatment (non_to_adv=1) and control group in the pre-change 
period, I investigate whether the means of the dependent variables differ between these 
groups. I find that the means of the dependent variables do not significantly differ 
between the non-advisory to advisory OMP change group and other OMP change control 
group with the exception of abs_dacc and pos_dacc (p < 5%) (untabulated). Furthermore, 
I follow the recommendation of Atanasov and Black (2015) and perform untabulated 
analyses to investigate whether the pre-change period covariate balances differ across the 
treatment and control group. For the pre-change period, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that my regression models balance all of their respective covariates with the 
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exception of the models for audfees, dacc, and abs_dacc. I find the primary cause for this 
imbalance is the yrs_omp variable which is an individual OMP characteristic and thus a 
product of the treatment identification. Therefore, the findings in Table 3 provide 
preliminary evidence consistent with a positive (negative) association between changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in NAS fees (audit quality). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS, 
Non-Audit Service Fees 
In evaluating the validity of my proposed explanation that a change to a more 
selling-oriented office culture underlies a negative association between changes from 
non-advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in audit quality, I test my first hypothesis 
(H1) by examining the relation between a change from a non-advisory to an advisory 
OMP and a change in client NAS fees relative to other changes in OMP. I estimate this 
relation using the following model: 
nasfees = α + β1non_to_adv + β2post + β3non_to_adv*post + β4ln_ta + β5roa  
+ β6py_car + β7leverage + β8inst_own + β9mtb + β10sqrt_bsegs + β11foreign  
+ β12short_tenure + β13ma + β14fin_ind + β15sales_growth + β16cacl + β17arinv  
+ β18loss + β19std_ret + β20gc_cy_py + β21xdops + β22zscore + β23restate_gen  
+ β24indexpert + β25yrs_omp + β26female_omp + β27firm%audit + β28firm%mas  
+ β29audfees + βjIndustry FE + βkYear FE + βmAuditFirm FE + ε (Model 1) 
The dependent variable, nasfees, is the natural logarithm of one plus the dollar 
value of client NAS fees as identified by the Audit Analytics database. In this model, the 
variable of interest is the non_to_adv*post. The variable non_to_adv is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the client year observation is associated with the years 
(-2, -1, +1, +2) immediately surrounding the year of change from a non-advisory OMP to 
an advisory OMP in the local office of the client’s auditor, and post is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the client year observation relates to the two years after 
an OMP change (+1, +2). H1 predicts a positive coefficient on non_to_adv*post such that 
the change in client NAS fees is significantly more positive for clients whose auditor’s 
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experience a change from a non-advisory to an advisory OMP relative to other changes in 
OMP. 
I draw from prior research (DeFond et al. 2002; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, 
and Raghunandan 2003) to identify other determinants of NAS fees for my regression 
model. These controls include variables which measure client financial and stock price 
performance, client complexity and risk, and the length of the auditor-client relationship. 
In addition to these variables, I also include a control for city-level industry expertise 
(indexpert), OMP characteristic controls for the number of consecutive years the OMP 
has been in charge of the local audit office (yrs_omp) and whether the OMP is female 
(female_omp), and audit firm controls for proportion of total U.S. revenues from audit 
services (firm%audit) and advisory services (firm%mas). I include the control for 
industry expertise as Ferguson, Francis, and Stokes (2003) and Francis, Reichelt, and 
Wang (2005) provide some evidence that the industry expertise premium that an auditor 
is able to charge is due to office-level industry leadership. Controls for other OMP 
characteristics are included to ensure that results are not driven by other (omitted) 
characteristics of the OMP while controls for audit firm revenues mitigate concerns that a 
national audit firm strategy drives the results. I also include a control for the level of audit 
fees charged to the client (audfees) as prior research suggests there is a significant 
association between audit and non-audit fees when using a single equation specification 
(Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford 2001; Craswell and Francis 1999; Whisenant et al. 
2003).
14
 Industry, audit firm, and year fixed effects are included to control for variation in 
                                                 
14
 As the purpose of this test is not to investigate the relationship between audit and non-audit fees, I do not 
utilize a simultaneous equation specification to control for the joint determination of audit and non-audit 
fees as suggested in Whisenant et al. (2003). However when utilizing this approach for the estimation of 
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NAS fees across industry, audit firm, and over time, though these coefficients are not 
reported. Lastly, in both models I cluster standard errors by year and audit client to 
control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 
2010). 
Table 4 presents the results for my estimation of Model 1 with nasfees as the 
dependent variable. The results provide evidence consistent with H1 such that 
non_to_adv*post is positive and significant (p < 1%). When evaluated at the sample 
mean for nasfees, the marginal effect for the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
indicates that, all else equal, the change in NAS fees is approximately $60,000 (64%) 
greater for clients whose auditor’s experience a change from a non-advisory to an 
advisory OMP relative to other changes in OMP.
15
 This finding supports my proposition 
that changing to an advisory OMP promotes a culture that emphasizes selling NAS more 
than compliance-oriented non-advisory OMPs. I also find that a number of the control 
variables have significant (p < 5%) coefficients consistent with prior research. 
Specifically, I find that client size and the client’s level of audit fees have significant 
positive associations with nasfees while clients in the initial years of an auditor client 
relationship have a negative association. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that py_car has a 
positive and significant association with nasfees while prior research (DeFond et al. 
2002; Whisenant et al. 2003) finds a negative association though this may be attributable 
                                                                                                                                                 
nasfees (untabulated), I find that the coefficient on non_to_adv*post remains positive and highly significant 
(p < 1%) while the coefficient on the predicted value of audfees falls out of significance (p > 10%). 
 
15
 In an untabulated analysis I find that the increase in likelihood that a client receives NAS from their 
auditor is 1.7% greater for those whose auditor experiences a change from a non-advisory to advisory OMP 
relative to other changes in OMP. For further robustness, I exclude tax services from NAS fees and find 
inferences remain unchanged suggesting these results are driven by audit related and management advisory 
services.  
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to the significant difference in our samples. Specifically, both DeFond et al. (2002) and 
Whisenant et al. (2003) use a sample of clients from fiscal year 2000 which is prior to the 
additional regulations imposed by SOX, and the former also focuses only on financially 
distressed clients. Lastly, I find that clients whose auditor employs a female OMP exhibit 
significantly lower NAS fees. 
Although the above results support H1 and confirm my proposition that changing 
to an advisory OMP increases the emphasis on selling NAS fees, it does not preclude the 
possibility that audit effort is also promoted. Using audit fees as my proxy for audit effort 
(Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Rice and Weber 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013), I investigate this 
relationship. Specifically, consistent with an incentive shift, I expect that offices that 
change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs have a non-positive association with 
changes in audit fees relative to other offices. I estimate this relationship utilizing the 
same controls that were included in Model 1 except for the substitution of nasfees for 
audfees and the inclusion of a variable to measure the number of days between fiscal 
year-end and the 10-K filing date (filing_lag). 
Table 5 presents the results of my regression to examine the impact of changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs on changes in audit fees. Consistent with my 
prediction, the results show that non_to_adv*post is not significant (p > 10%) in 
predicting audit fees. This finding provides some evidence that changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs are not associated with an incremental decrease in audit effort 
at these offices; however, when combined with the results for NAS fees, it suggests that 
this change may shift auditors’ focus away from audit quality. Similar to my model for 
NAS fees, I find that a number of the control variables have significant (p < 5%) 
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associations with audit fees, consistent with prior research. Specifically, I find that ln_ta, 
foreign, arinv, loss, filing_lag, std_ret, indexpert, and nasfees all have positive 
associations with audfees while roa, cacl, and zscore have negative associations. Lastly, I 
find that clients whose audit office has a longer tenured OMP have lower audit fees while 
clients whose office employs a female OMP have higher audit fees.  
Overall, the above results provide some evidence that changing to advisory OMPs 
increases the focus on promoting NAS and thus potentially decreases the focus on audit 
quality relative to other OMP changes. As such, these results provide a basis for 
investigation of whether changes to advisory OMPs are associated with incremental 
decreases in audit quality relative to other changes in OMP. In doing so, I follow the 
implication of DeFond and Zhang (2014) by using multiple proxies for audit quality to 
provide more robust evidence as to the impact on different dimensions of audit quality. I 
measure audit quality using three output-based measures of audit quality (i.e., going-
concern reporting, restatements, and discretionary accruals) which can be categorized as 
auditor communications, material misstatements, and financial reporting quality, 
respectively. I chose these three measures as the auditor has direct influence over each of 
these proxies at a decreasing magnitude in the order presented above. Furthermore, these 
measures also provide variation as to the severity of audit issues with going-concern 
reporting and restatements being more severe than discretionary accruals. In utilizing 
these three measures of audit quality, I am able to provide a more comprehensive picture 
of whether changes in tone at the top (i.e., OMP) are associated with changes in audit 
quality. 
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Going Concern Reporting 
In testing H2, I first examine the relation between changes from non-advisory to 
advisory OMPs and changes in auditor going concern (GC) reporting relative to other 
changes in OMP. A going concern report represents the auditor’s assessment of whether 
there is substantial doubt about their client's ability to continue as a going concern. Prior 
research has shown that going concern reports impose unfavorable costs on clients and 
thus they are likely to pressure auditors to issue a clean opinion (Carson, Geiger, Lennox, 
Raghunandan, and Willekens 2013). Therefore, I investigate whether this change in OMP 
impacts the change in GC reporting (gc). I estimate this relation using the following logit 
model:
16
 
Going Concern DVs = α + β1non_to_adv + β2post + β3non_to_adv*post + β4ln_ta  
+ β5sales_growth + β6py_car + β7std_ret + β8long_tenure + β9litigation  
+ β10gc_py + β11zscore + β12cash + β13loss + β14roa + β15cfo + β16leverage  
+ β17mtb + β18fin + β19std_sales + β20nas_ratio + β21indexpert + β22yrs_omp  
+ β23female_omp + β24firm%audit + β25firm%mas + βjIndustry FE + βkYear FE  
+ βmAuditFirm FE + ε (Model 2) 
The dependent variable, gc, is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if 
the client received a going-concern audit opinion for the year. As GC report issuance 
reflects more conservative reporting, H2 predicts a negative coefficient on 
non_to_adv*post such that the change in GC report issuance is significantly more 
negative (i.e., less conservative) for audit offices which experience a change in OMP 
from non-advisory to advisory relative to offices that experience other changes in OMP.  
                                                 
16
 According to recent research (e.g., Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist 2013), using a linear model could 
ease interpretation of coefficients and interaction terms in Models 2 and 3. Thus, in untabulated analyses, I 
run OLS regressions for these models and find qualitatively similar results for both GC reporting and 
restatements.  
  27 
Consistent with prior research, my model includes a number of control variables 
which measure financial and stock price performance, leverage and financing, risk, and 
prior GC reporting behavior of the client (e.g., Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1987; 
Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown 1997; Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond et al. 
2002; Lisic et al. 2015). In addition to these controls, I also include a control for city-
level industry expertise (indexpert), a control for NAS fees as a proportion of total fees at 
the client-level (nas_ratio), yrs_omp and female_omp to control for additional OMP 
characteristics, and firm%audit and firm%mas to control for audit firm level revenues. I 
include the control for industry expertise as Francis and Yu (2009) provide some 
evidence that the city-level industry expertise leads to a higher incidence of GC reporting. 
Furthermore, I include nas_ratio in my model to provide further evidence that the non-
advisory to advisory OMP change indicator is not capturing the effects of impaired 
independence due to an increase in NAS. The controls for other OMP characteristics and 
audit firm characteristics are included to ensure that the results for my variable of interest 
are not driven by other (omitted) characteristics of the OMP and national audit firm 
strategies, respectively. Lastly, I include industry, audit firm, and year fixed effects as 
well as cluster standard errors by year and audit client in both models.  
Table 6 presents the results of my regressions to examine the impact of changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs on changes in GC reporting (gc). Column 1 
includes all audit clients with the required data for variables in the going concern model. 
Column 2 includes only those audit clients that exhibit financial distress, defined as 
clients that exhibit negative net income and/or negative cash flows from operations (e.g., 
Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond et al. 2002). The results provide evidence consistent 
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with H2 such that non_to_adv*post is negative and significant (p < 5%) in both 
columns.
17
 Evaluated at the means of the control variables for the distressed client 
sample, the marginal effects indicate that in the sample of other changes in OMP, post is 
associated with an increase of 1.7% in the probability of gc, but a decrease of 0.2% in the 
sample of changes from non-advisory to advisory OMPs, and that the difference of 1.9% 
is economically meaningful given that only 5.4% of the distressed sample receive GC 
reports.
18
 Thus, the findings for GC report issuance suggest that changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs reflect a move to less conservative reporting behavior.
19
 
Lastly, I also find that a number of the control variables have significant (p < 5%) 
coefficients consistent with prior research. I find that prior year GC reporting and current 
year loss have significant positive associations with gc while Altman (1968) Z-score has 
a negative association. Furthermore, consistent with DeFond et al. (2002), I find that 
std_ret has a positive (p < 10%) association while py_car has a negative association with 
GC reporting, respectively. 
Restatements 
In my second test of H2, I next examine the relation between changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in subsequent financial statement restatements 
relative to other changes in OMP. Prior literature has used restatements as a proxy for 
                                                 
17
 Given this result for gc and Carson et al.’s (2013) finding that over 98% of companies that receive a 
going concern report survive for at least a year, I unsurprisingly find that non_to_adv*post is also negative 
and significant (p < 5%) for regressions of for Type I going concern reporting errors (type1gc). This result 
does not diminish the importance of my results for gc, whereby less conservative reporting is observed. 
 
18
 Following Ai and Norton (2003), I also examine the interaction effects across the range of predicted 
probabilities (0 to 1) for each dependent variable in Models 2 and 3. I find that although statistical 
significance varies slightly across the range, all interaction effects are directionally consistent with the 
documented marginal effects. 
  
19
 Inferences remain unchanged when focusing on only first-time GC reporting behavior. 
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audit quality as they represent clear and severe signals of low quality audits (Kinney et al. 
2004; Chin and Chi 2009; Francis and Michas 2013). In cases where clients subsequently 
restate, it is likely that auditors failed in their responsibility to provide reasonable 
assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements. Following the 
suggestion of Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008), I investigate multiple types of 
restatements that vary in severity while excluding clerical errors. I examine the 
association between changes from non-advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in the 
incidence of general restatements, core-account restatements (i.e., restatements in 
revenue, cost of sales, on-going operating expenses, and their related balance sheet 
accounts), and egregious restatements resulting from SEC investigations or fraud. I 
estimate these relations using the following logit model for each dependent variable: 
Restatement DVs = α + β1non_to_adv + β2post + β3non_to_adv*post + β4ln_ta  
+ β5sales_growth + β6py_car + β7long_tenure + β8litigation + β9arinv + β10cash  
+ β11roa + β12fin + β13std_ret + β14restate_gen_py + β15mw + β16leverage  
+ β17mtb + β18std_sales + β19nas_ratio + β20indexpert + β21yrs_omp  
+ β22female_omp + β23firm%audit + β24firm%mas + βjIndustry FE + βkYear FE  
+ βmAuditFirm FE + ε (Model 3) 
The dependent variables, restate_gen, restate_core, and restate_egreg, are 
indicator variables that take the value of one if the financial statements for the year are 
subsequently restated, restated in one of the core accounts, and restated due to SEC 
investigations or fraud, respectively. As subsequent restatements reflect low quality 
audits, H2 predicts a positive coefficient on non_to_adv*post such that the change in 
subsequent restatements is significantly more positive for the clients of audit offices 
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which experience a change in OMP from non-advisory to advisory relative to the clients 
of offices that experience other changes in OMP.  
Consistent with prior research, my model includes a number of control variables 
which measure financial and stock price performance, leverage and financing, client risk 
and internal control reporting, and prior restatements (e.g., Blankley, Hurtt, and 
MacGregor 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2014; Lisic et al. 2015). 
As with the GC reporting model, I also include controls for city-level industry expertise, 
NAS fees as a proportion of total fees at the client-level, additional OMP characteristics, 
and audit firm level revenues. Lastly, the models include industry, audit firm, and year 
fixed effects as well as cluster standard errors by year and audit client. 
Table 7 presents the results of my regressions to examine the impact of changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs on changes in subsequent restatements. Column 1 
presents the results for general restatements (restate_gen), Column 2 presents the results 
for core-account restatements (restate_core), and Column 3 presents the results for 
egregious restatements (restate_egreg), respectively. Column 3 provides evidence 
consistent with H2. Specifically, the results show that non_to_adv*post is positive and 
significant (p < 5%). Evaluated at the means of the control variables, the marginal effects 
indicate that in the sample of other changes in OMP, post is associated with a decrease of 
0.3% in the probability of restate_egreg, but no variation (0.0%) in the sample of 
changes from non-advisory to advisory OMPs, and that the difference of 0.3% is 
economically meaningful given that only 1.1% of my sample subsequently restate their 
financial statements because of fraud or SEC investigations. For Column 2, the 
coefficient on non_to_adv*post is positive but insignificant (p > 10%) suggesting that the 
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change in audit quality as proxied by core account restatements does not differ for the 
clients of audit offices which experience a change in OMP from non-advisory to advisory 
relative to the clients of offices that experience other changes in OMP. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Column 1 provides evidence inconsistent with H2 in that 
audit quality improves for offices that change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs as 
the likelihood of general restatements decreases more for these offices. Specifically, the 
results show that non_to_adv*post is negative and marginally significant (p < 10%). 
Evaluated at the means of the control variables, the marginal effects indicate that in the 
sample of other changes in OMP, post is associated with an increase of 1.7% in the 
probability of restate_gen, but a decrease of 0.1% in the sample of changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs, and that the difference of 1.8% is economically meaningful 
given that 9.7% of my sample are required to subsequently restate their financial 
statements. Although this result is inconsistent with my prediction in H2, I examine the 
relationship further and find that among clients with prior year restatements the 
likelihood of general restatements increases 1.3% more for offices that change from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs (untabulated). Although these results provide somewhat 
mixed evidence as to the association between changes from non-advisory to advisory 
OMPs and changes in restatements, overall the findings suggest that these offices are less 
likely to find more serious and more persistent misstatements during the audit and 
therefore provide lower audit quality. 
Regarding the control variables, I find that restate_gen_py is positive and highly 
significant (p < 1%) across all three regressions. Furthermore, I find that the majority of 
control variables are insignificant (p > 10%) in all regressions likely due to the significant 
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predictive power of prior year restatements which has largely been ignored in prior 
research with the exception of Lobo and Zhao (2013).
20
 Interestingly, I find that both 
firm%audit and firm%mas are both negative and significant in Columns 1 and 2 while 
positive and significant in Column 3 suggesting that higher proportions of audit and 
advisory services decrease the likelihood of general and core-account restatements and 
increase the likelihood of egregious restatements. Furthermore, I find some evidence that 
clients with a greater proportion of NAS fees relative to total fees exhibit a lower 
likelihood of core-account restatements, though the negative coefficient is only 
marginally significant (p < 10%). 
Discretionary Accruals 
In my final test of H2, I examine the association between changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in discretionary accruals relative to other 
changes in OMP. Prior literature has used measures of financial reporting quality that 
proxy for earnings management as another measure of audit quality (Francis and Yu 
2009; Francis and Michas 2013; Hope, Thomas, and Vyas 2013). As discussed in 
DeFond and Zhang (2014), measures of financial reporting quality are less directly 
influenced by auditors and less severe relative to restatements or GC reporting, as 
fluctuation in accruals may not indicate failures to follow GAAP or substantial doubt 
about a client’s ability to continue operation. However, given the parallel nature of 
financial reporting quality and audit quality, there is likely some within GAAP variation 
in financial reporting quality which may result as a product of both management’s and 
                                                 
20
 Upon excluding restate_gen_py from my model, the coefficient on non_to_adv*post is positive for all 
three models and significant for core-account and egregious restatements at p < 10% and 5%, respectively. 
However, its exclusion reduces the area under the ROC curve to approximately 0.70 suggesting a relatively 
poor model. 
  33 
the auditor’s input with regard to the financial statements. As such, I measure 
discretionary accruals (DACC) using the Modified Jones Model (Jones 1991; Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney 1995). I examine the association between changes from non-
advisory to advisory OMPs and changes in signed DACC, the absolute value of DACC, 
income-increasing (positive) DACC, and income-decreasing (negative) DACC given that 
each can be indicative of opportunistic earnings management behavior. I estimate these 
relations using the following model for each dependent variable: 
Discretionary Accruals DVs = α + β1non_to_adv + β2post + β3non_to_adv*post + β4ln_ta  
+ β5long_tenure + β6litigation + β7(Prior Year DA measure)+ β8arinv + β9cash  
+ β10roa + β11leverage + β12mtb + β13fin + β14std_sales + β15nas_ratio  
+ β16indexpert + β17yrs_omp + β18female_omp + β19firm%audit + β20firm%mas  
+ βjIndustry FE + βkYear FE + βmAuditFirm FE + ε  (Model 4) 
The dependent variables, dacc, abs_dacc, pos_dacc and neg_dacc, represent 
signed DACC, the absolute value of DACC, income-increasing DACC, and income-
decreasing DACC, respectively. As greater discretionary accruals reflect lower financial 
reporting quality and thus audit quality, H2 predicts a positive coefficient on 
non_to_adv*post such that the change in discretionary accruals is significantly more 
positive for the clients of audit offices which experience a change in OMP from non-
advisory to advisory relative to the clients of offices that experience other changes in 
OMP.  
Consistent with prior research, my model includes a number of control variables 
which measure financial and stock price performance, leverage and financing, client risk, 
and prior discretionary accruals (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009; Francis and Michas 2013). 
As with the previous models, I also include controls for city-level industry expertise, 
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NAS fees as a proportion of total fees at the client-level, additional OMP characteristics, 
and audit firm level revenues. Lastly, the models include industry, audit firm, and year 
fixed effects as well as cluster standard errors by year and audit client. 
Table 8 presents the results of my regressions to examine the impact of changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs on changes in discretionary accruals. Column 1 
presents the results for signed DACC (dacc), Column 2 presents the results for the 
absolute value of DACC (abs_dacc), Column 3 presents the results for income-increasing 
DACC (pos_dacc), and Column 4 presents the results for income-decreasing DACC 
(neg_dacc), respectively. Column 1 does not support H2. Specifically, the results show 
that non_to_adv*post is postitive but insignificant (p > 10%) suggesting that changes 
from non-advisory to advisory OMPs do no impact audit quality as proxied by signed 
DACC. In contrast, Column 2 supports H2 as non_to_adv*post is both positive and 
significant (p < 5%). The marginal effect for the estimated coefficient indicates that, all 
else equal, the change in the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 0.020 greater for 
clients whose auditor’s experience a change from a non-advisory to an advisory OMP 
relative to other changes in OMP. When evaluated at the sample mean for abs_dacc 
(0.126), this change is economically significant.  
The remaining columns investigate where this increase in the abs_dacc lies, 
whether due to income-increasing or income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Column 3 
shows that non_to_adv*post is positive yet insignificant (p > 10%). Therefore, the 
association between changes in the absolute value of DACCs and changes to advisory 
OMPs is not driven by income-increasing DACC. However, Column 4 shows that 
non_to_adv*post is positive and marginally significant (p < 10%) suggesting that 
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income-decreasing DACC may drive this association. Specifically, the marginal effect for 
the estimated coefficient indicates that, all else equal, the change in the negative DACC is 
0.038 greater for clients whose auditor’s experience a change from a non-advisory to an 
advisory OMP relative to other changes in OMP. Thus, these results suggest that offices 
that change from a non-advisory to advisory OMP are no more willing than other offices 
to allow their clients to engage in income-increasing earnings management, but will 
allow the client to take a big bath (i.e., income-decreasing earnings management). 
Overall, these results provide some evidence that a change from a non-advisory to an 
advisory OMP is associated with a greater reduction in audit quality relative to other 
changes in OMP. 
I also find that some control variables have significant (p < 5%) coefficients 
consistent with prior research. I find that the prior year discretionary accruals measure is 
positive and significant across all regressions except for neg_dacc. Furthermore, I find 
that return on assets and leverage have significant positive associations with dacc and 
pos_dacc while client size has a negative association with those dependent variables, 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Francis and Michas 2013; Lisic et al. 2015). Lastly, I 
find that both financing and leverage load positively with all dependent variables and are 
significant for both dacc and pos_dacc. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Endogeneity in OMP Selection 
In additional analyses, I examine the possibility that the decision to replace a non-
advisory OMP with an advisory OMP is a strategic choice; however, I argue that this is 
unlikely to be the case. First, my results are robust to the inclusion of audit firm level 
controls for the proportion of total U.S. revenues from audit services and advisory 
services. Second, although the results for my analysis of NAS fees are consistent with a 
strategic choice explanation, the explanation fails to adequately explain a decline in audit 
quality. Specifically, given the trend of increased oversight and more rigorous standards 
for accounting firms over my sample period (Ernst & Young [EY] 2012), the explanation 
that accounting firms make a strategic choice to provide lower audit quality seems 
unreasonable. Instead, I would expect the accounting firms to strategically emphasize 
audit quality improvement and thus observe an increase in audit quality over my sample 
period. Nonetheless, in order to mitigate concerns that my results are due to a strategic 
choice, I regress OMP changes on a number of audit office revenue and office-level audit 
quality related variables that are likely associated with a strategic decision to change 
OMP.  
Table 9 presents the results of my regressions to examine the influence of prior 
year measures of audit office revenues (e.g., audit, tax, MAS, audit-related) and office-
level audit quality (e.g., DACC, restatements, GCs) on the likelihood that an audit office 
changes OMP. In utilizing prior year measures, I investigate whether local office levels 
of revenues and audit quality are associated with a change in OMP in the subsequent 
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year. Columns 1 and 2 present the results for all OMP changes (omp_change) and 
changes from a non-advisory to advisory OMP (non_to_adv) for the full sample of audit-
office years in which data was available. Column 3 presents the results for changes from 
a non-advisory to advisory OMP (non_to_adv) for only those 147 office change years 
which are included in my primary analyses. I find the area under the ROC curve for each 
regression is less than 0.70 suggesting relatively poor models based upon these strategy-
focused office-level measures. Furthermore, across all regressions, I find only one 
coefficient to be significant. In Column 2, the coefficient representing the total audit-
related fees at the local audit office is positive and significant (p < 5%) suggesting that as 
the prior year level of audit-related fees at the local office increases the likelihood of a 
change from a non-advisory to advisory OMP increases. Thus, based on these 
regressions, I find little evidence that changes in OMP occur non-randomly (strategically) 
in relation to measures of office-level revenues and audit quality. 
Non-Change Control Group 
For further robustness, I utilize a second benchmark group of offices that do not 
change OMP to provide further evidence that the associations I find are distinct from the 
overall trends in the audit profession. Specifically, I identify 77 offices with at least six 
consecutive years without an OMP change and generate a pre/post split at the end of the 
median year of the OMP’s tenure for each non-change office in order to perform 
difference-in-difference analyses.
21
 In doing so, I simulate a change in OMP for the non-
change control clients and thus control for contemporaneous effects that are unrelated to 
                                                 
21
 Alternatively, I perform a levels comparison in which all clients of non-change offices are classified as 
pre-OMP change observations. In doing so, I find that after changes from non-advisory to advisory OMPs, 
clients are less likely to receive a GC report, more likely to have a core restatement, and exhibit greater 
absolute value of DACCs relative to all clients prior to an OMP change. 
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other changes in OMP. These untabulated results show that the coefficients for 
non_to_adv*post are generally consistent with my primary findings with the exception of 
the tests for restatements, where I do not find significance. Furthermore, I also find that 
non_to_adv*post is negative and marginally significant (p > 10%) in my test of audit fees 
when utilizing the non-change control sample. The marginal effect indicates that audit 
effort decreases as the change in audit fees is approximately $103,000 (8%) lower for 
clients whose auditor’s experience a change from a non-advisory to an advisory OMP 
relative to those that do not change OMP. Overall, these results further strengthen my 
findings that offices that change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs exhibit 
incremental increases in NAS fees and incremental decreases in audit quality relative to 
other offices. 
Detailed Non-Advisory to Advisory Splits 
I also repeat my analyses using a more detailed identification of non-advisory to 
advisory OMP changes. I partition the treatment group between audit to advisory changes 
and tax to advisory changes. I then replace non_to_adv with an indicator for each detailed 
group as well as interactions with the post variable. The interaction terms for both groups 
show results qualitatively consistent with those of my primary tests with the exception of 
restate_gen and neg_dacc for tax to advisory changes which are both insignificant. 
Furthermore, these findings suggest my main results are largely due to changes from an 
audit to advisory OMP; however, this is likely due to the additional power associated 
with this group as it represents 84% of non-advisory to advisory OMP changes. 
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Office Size 
In supplemental analyses, I examine whether the OMP’s effect on audit quality 
varies with the size of the audit firm office because the OMP’s influence over office 
culture likely differs with the size of the office. In doing so, I contribute to prior research 
examining the influence of audit office size on audit quality (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi, 
Chansog, Kim, and Zang 2010). I partition the sample by identifying the fifty largest Big 
Four offices based on the total fees for the most recent year in my sample and assigning 
them to the large office group and all other offices to the small office group. Ex ante, it is 
unclear whether the association between the change to an advisory OMP and audit 
quality will be stronger at large or small offices. On one hand, large offices contain the 
greatest proportion of advisory resources and their OMPs are typically more influential 
within accounting firms increasing their ability to incentivize advisory opportunities at 
the expense of audit quality. On the other hand, OMPs in small offices may have greater 
visibility and, thus, any cultural changes understating the importance of audit quality may 
be more easily disseminated in a small office. The results provide evidence consistent 
with the former explanation. That is, my findings for going concern reporting and 
subsequent restatements are primarily driven by large audit offices. Overall, these results 
suggest that changes to advisory OMPs are more influential in large offices, exhibiting a 
greater negative effect on audit quality. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Given the recent emphasis on growth in advisory services at the Big Four 
accounting firms, regulators and academics are expressing concerns about the potential 
for impaired audit quality. PCAOB board members have suggested that a culture shaped 
by the advisory function could be detrimental to audit quality (PCAOB 2014b, 2015a). 
Therefore, this study investigates how changes in an accounting firm’s tone at the top, as 
measured by changes in OMP, impact non-audit service fees and audit quality. Moreover, 
this study is the first to examine whether the OMP’s line of service impacts non-audit 
service revenues and the quality of audits delivered in their office. Overall, my findings 
suggest that clients in offices that change from non-advisory to advisory OMPs have 
incremental increases in non-audit service revenues and incremental reductions in audit 
quality relative to other changes in OMP.  
My study contributes to the auditing literature by providing evidence on one 
potential underlying mechanism (i.e., tone at the top) that shifts auditors’ focus away 
from providing high-quality audits. Thus, the results of this study inform regulators that 
audit quality does in fact suffer when non-audit services are a larger focus, as indicated 
by the functional background of the OMP. These results are also informative for 
discussions of “audit only” service providers (EC 2010). Additionally, this study 
identifies an easily obtainable measure of “tone at the top” which the PCAOB has 
recognized as one potential indicator of audit quality. Lastly, this study answers a call for 
future research on accounting firm culture as one of the first archival studies to examine 
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the association between an audit firm’s office-level leadership and audit quality (Jenkins 
et al. 2008).  
While this study leaves open for future research how and why certain office 
managing partners are appointed, the results are likely to be of interest to accounting 
firms, regulators, investors, and researchers as the OMP’s line of service is associated 
with both non-audit fees and audit quality. Although I do provide initial models of OMP 
changes, future research can build upon these by examining other aspects and influences 
on OMP selection. The inferences of this study are also subject to a few important 
caveats. First, while the difference-in-difference research design and use of multiple 
control groups does mitigate some concerns about causality, my study is still limited to 
an association. Second, the potential for sampling bias exists because I hand collect data 
on OMP changes from external sources; however to the extent that it does exist, it is 
unlikely that it would differentially impact my treatment and control groups. Overall, 
though, it is important to recognize that this study represents a first attempt at examining 
the influence of accounting firm office managing partners and provides evidence that 
these individuals have a significant impact on the audit environment. 
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HAND COLLECTION PROCESS DETAILS  
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Steps followed in hand collection process 
 
1. I Identified Big Four audit-office locations from the Audit Analytics population. 
 
2. Utilizing the advanced search feature for the social networking site, I searched for 
keywords “managing partner” while limiting my search to the auditor and city of the 
office using the company and location fields. 
 
3. This would provide a list of users sorted by relevance with titles and locations similar to 
my search criteria. I would investigate each users profile to identify the audit office OMP. 
 
4. In doing so, I gathered relevant background information for the identified OMP as 
underlined in the following example of a profile from social networking site (John Smith, 
Assurance Partner for Audit Firm A in City A, Effective Date: July 2002).  
 It should be noted, that some profiles contain an abundance of information while 
others are sparsely populated. Given this variability in the amount of information 
provided, other information sources were also utilized. 
 
5. For each OMP, I then examined alternative data sources (e.g., local industry journals and 
state CPA society press releases) to substantiate the information and mitigate concerns 
over the reliability of the social networking site data. I did so by using a search engine to 
search for keywords including the OMP’s name, audit firm, and office location. The 
following PR Newswire press release is an example of the data source utilized (John 
Smith, Assurance Partner for Audit Firm A in City A, Effective Date: July 2011).  
 Although, the name and information has been generalized, the PR Newswire 
press release and social networking site profile represent the same OMP. 
 
6. I then compare the background information obtained from each data source, identifying 
any discrepancies. The example sources provided show inconsistency with regard to the 
effective date that the OMP began managing the office. In these instances of conflicting 
information, I utilize the background information as provided in the alternative data 
source. 
 Information contained in news articles are evaluated for credibility prior to 
printing, whereas social networking sites contain user submitted information. 
 
7. Alternative data sources also provide valuable additional information. The example 
provided includes the name of the OMP succeeded (“James Jones”). Upon identifying the 
succeeded OMP, I return to Step 2 and gather background information for the prior OMP. 
 As the hand collection moves further into the past, the likelihood of a social 
networking profile for the OMP decreases. Thus, when no profile is present, I 
instead return to step 5. 
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Profile from social networking site for professionals 
 
John Smith 
US Assurance Partner at Audit Firm A LLP,  
Managing Partner – City A Office 
 
Current: Audit Firm A LLP 
Previous: Audit Firm B LLP 
Education: University A 
 
Summary 
I have been with Audit Firm A since 2002 and have been an assurance partner since 
2000. Prior to joining Audit Firm A, I spent 12 years in the accounting profession with 
Audit Firm B. My career has largely been focused on serving large, multi-national clients 
in the Region A region. I also serve as the Office Managing Partner for Audit Firm A's 
practice in City A. 
 
Experience 
Partner - Managing Partner 
Audit Firm A 
July 2002 – Present (12 years 11 months)City A, State Area 
 
As a partner in our industrial products sector, I am largely responsible for delivering audit 
and audit related services to our large complex manufacturing clients. In this role, my 
main focus is on clients with large manufacturing and distribution operations, including 
leading numerous international Audit Firm A teams in the delivery of Audit Firm A's 
global services.  
 
I have handled numerous special projects across a variety of industries including 
aerospace, transportation, medical device and medical technologies, health industries, 
automotive and retail and consumer. These projects have included initial public offerings, 
public and private debt offerings, mergers and acquisitions, spin-off transactions, 
divestitures and various complex tax projects including international tax restructurings. I 
am familiar with a variety of financing structures and related accounting and reporting 
considerations. 
 
Former 
Audit Firm B 
1990 – 2002 (12 years) 
. 
. 
(Further information when available) 
 
*underlines are included for emphasis to highlight the background information collected 
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PR Newswire press release 
 
Audit Firm A Announces Leadership Appointments in City A and Region A Market 
John Smith Named Managing Partner of Firm's City A Office; Joe Rogers Named Region 
A Advisory Leader 
 
City A, June 21, 2011 /PRNewswire/ -- Audit Firm A US announced today that John 
Smith has been named managing partner of the firm's City A office, effective July 1, 
2011. He will direct the strategy and operations of Audit Firm A in the State A market. 
Mr. Smith succeeds James Jones, who is joining Company A this month as the senior 
vice president and chief financial officer of the company's operating unit. 
 
In a related development, Joe Rogers will assume the new role of Audit Firm A's Region 
A Market Advisory leader. In this position, Mr. Rogers will continue to provide 
consulting services to clients in the City A market and lead the Advisory practice in State 
B and State C, as well. 
 
Mr. Smith is an assurance partner who has served as global engagement partner for a 
number of Audit Firm A's private and public company clients. He began his career in 
1990 with Audit Firm B in City A and was admitted to the Audit Firm A partnership in 
2002. Mr. Smith has extensive client service experience having worked on numerous 
equity and debt offerings, including initial public offerings, mergers and acquisitions, 
spin-offs and other types of transactions. Mr. Smith is also Audit Firm A's firm-wide 
relationship partner for University A, his alma mater.  
 
Commenting on his strategic vision for the practice, Mr. Smith said "We thank James for 
his service and hope to build on his legacy of success and growth in the market. We will 
continue to seek opportunities to grow the careers of our talented people, maintain a 
strong presence in the local community and provide distinctive service to companies in 
the region. The State A business community is vibrant and we look forward to helping 
our clients compete better in the dynamic global economy." 
 
(Further information when available) 
 
© 2011 Audit Firm A. All rights reserved. "Audit Firm A" and "Audit Firm A US" refer 
to Audit Firm A LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership, which is a member firm of 
Audit Firm A International Limited, each member firm of which is a separate legal entity. 
 
SOURCE Audit Firm A 
 
*underlines are included for emphasis to highlight the background information collected 
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Variable Description 
Variables of Interest 
non_to_adv 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
year observation is associated with a change from a non-
advisory OMP to an advisory OMP, and zero otherwise. 
post 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
year observation relates to the two years after an OMP 
change, and zero otherwise. 
nasfees 
Natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value of client non-
audit service fees as identified by the Audit Analytics 
database. 
audfees 
Natural logarithm of one plus the dollar value of client 
audit fees as identified by the Audit Analytics database. 
gc 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
received a going-concern audit opinion for the year, and 
zero otherwise. 
type1gc 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
received a going-concern audit opinion for the year and 
does not subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next year, 
and zero otherwise. 
type2gc 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
received a clean audit opinion for the year and then 
subsequently files for bankruptcy in the next year, and zero 
otherwise. 
restate_gen 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
financial statements for the year are subsequently restated 
(excluding clerical errors), and zero otherwise. 
restate_core 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
financial statements for the year are subsequently restated 
(excluding clerical errors) in one of the core accounts (i.e., 
revenue, cost of sales, on-going operating expenses, and 
their related balance sheet accounts), and zero otherwise. 
This definition is consistent with Lisic et al. (2015). 
restate_egreg 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
financial statements for the year are subsequently restated 
due to fraud or an SEC investigation (excluding clerical 
errors), and zero otherwise. 
dacc 
Discretionary accruals computed using the Modified Jones 
Model (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). 
abs_dacc The absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
pos_dacc Positive (income-increasing) discretionary accruals. 
neg_dacc 
The absolute value of negative (income-decreasing) 
discretionary accruals. 
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Financial Statement Controls 
ln_ta Natural logarithm of total assets. 
arinv 
Ratio of accounts receivable and inventory relative to total 
assets. 
cash Ratio of cash relative to total assets. 
roa 
Ratio of income before extraordinary items relative to total 
assets. 
leverage Ratio of total debt relative to total assets. 
mtb 
Ratio of market value of equity relative to book value of 
equity. 
fin 
Ratio of total stock and debt issuances relative to total 
assets. 
std_sales Standard deviation of client sales over the past three years. 
dacc_py Prior year discretionary accruals (dacc). 
abs_dacc_py 
Prior year absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(abs_dacc). 
litigation 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the client operates 
in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833-2836, 
3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370), and zero 
otherwise. 
sales_growth The percentage growth in sales for the year. 
cacl Ratio of current assets relative to current liabilities. 
zscore Z-score as measured by the Altman (1968) Z-Score. 
loss 
An indicator variable equal to one if net income was 
negative for the year, and zero otherwise. 
ma 
An indicator variable set equal to one if client engaged in 
mergers or acquisitions during the year, and zero otherwise. 
fin_ind 
An indicator variable set equal to one if client issued stock 
or debt during the year, and zero otherwise. 
foreign 
An indicator variable equal to one if the client engages in 
foreign transactions during the year, and zero otherwise. 
xdops 
An indicator variable equal to one if the client reported 
extraordinary items or discontinued operations, and zero 
otherwise. 
sqrt_bsegs The square root of the number of business segments. 
cfo Ratio of cash flows from operations relative to total assets. 
  
Market Based Controls 
py_car 
The excess return from a one-factor model of expected 
daily returns. Parameters of the model are estimated for 
each Compustat client-year from two years before fiscal 
year end to one year before fiscal year end (-504,-252). 
Abnormal returns, the error from the one factor model, are 
summed across the current fiscal year from the beginning 
  55 
of the fiscal year to the end of the fiscal year (-251,0). A 
minimum of four months of data (85 observations) is 
required for estimation and event windows. 
std_ret 
Standard deviation of daily returns over the twelve month 
period ending as of the fiscal year-end date. I require at 
least 85 non-missing daily return observations during the 
measurement period. 
inst_own 
Institutional ownership percentage at the quarter of the 
client’s fiscal year-end (QYE) or the most recent calendar 
quarter prior to the client’s fiscal year-end. 
  
Audit Related Controls 
long_tenure 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the current auditor-
client relationship has been in place for four or more 
consecutive years. 
nas_ratio 
Ratio of client non-audit service fees relative to client total 
fees. 
indexpert 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the audit office is 
an industry specialist, defined as an audit office whose 
audit fee market share in the 2-digit SIC code exceeds 30 
percent in the local Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), 
and zero otherwise. 
restate_gen_py 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the 
financial statements for the prior year are subsequently 
restated (excluding clerical errors), and zero otherwise. 
mw 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
reports a material weakness for the year, and zero 
otherwise. 
short_tenure 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the current auditor-
client relationship has been in place for two or fewer 
consecutive years. 
filing_lag 
The number of days between fiscal year-end and the 10-K 
filing date. 
gc_cy_py 
An indicator variable equal to one if the client received a 
going-concern audit opinion in either the current or prior 
year, and zero otherwise. 
gc_py 
An indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
received a going-concern audit opinion in the prior year, 
and zero otherwise. 
  
Office Managing Partner and Audit Firm Controls 
yrs_omp 
The number of consecutive years the OMP has been in 
charge of the local audit office. 
female_omp 
An indicator variable set equal to one if the current audit 
office OMP is female, and zero otherwise. 
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firm%audit 
From Accounting Today, the proportion of U.S. audit and 
attest to U.S. total revenues for the accounting firm. 
firm%mas 
From Accounting Today, the proportion of U.S. 
management advisory and other fees to U.S. total revenues 
for the accounting firm. 
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FIGURE AND TABLES  
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 FIGURE 1 
Percentage of Office Managing Partners Identified as Audit, Tax, and Advisory for 
the Big Four Audit Firms (2003-2011) 
 
 
This figure presents the annual sample distribution for all auditor-city-OMP-years partitioned by line of 
service. 
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TABLE 1 
Office Managing Partner Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Office Managing Partner Descriptive Statistics by Line of Service 
 
 Audit Tax Advisory Total 
     
Years 
Experience 
 23.41  23.42 23.79 23.48 
 (24.00)  (23.00) (24.00) (24.00) 
Years Partner 12.82 12.99 13.64 13.00 
 (13.00  (13.00)  (14.00)   (13.00) 
Years OMP  6.08  4.87  5.16 5.72  
 (5.42)  (3.75)  (4.51)   (5.00) 
Female OMP  0.15  0.10  0.20 0.15  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00) 
Observations 515 125 143 783 
 
 
Panel B: Office Managing Partner Line of Service by Year 
 
Year Audit Tax Advisory Total % Advisory 
2003 131 37 24 192 12.5% 
2004 144 37 28 209 13.4% 
2005 152 39 30 221 13.6% 
2006 162 37 35 234 15.0% 
2007 159 37 46 242 19.0% 
2008 167 32 47 246 19.1% 
2009 174 32 52 258 20.2% 
2010 170 29 56 255 22.0% 
2011 171 28 60 259 23.2% 
Total 1,430 308 378 2,116 17.9% 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for various OMP characteristics at the auditor-city-OMP level partitioned 
by line of service (Panel A) and the annual sample distribution for all auditor-city-OMP-years which were identified 
from my hand collection process (Panel B). Years Experience is the number of years of accounting experience the 
professional had before being assigned as the OMP. Years Partnera is the number of years the individual has been 
identified as a partner. Years OMP is the number of years the individual has been in the position of OMP for identified 
location. Female OMP indicates whether the OMP is female. 
a Years Partner was not always identified in the materials from which background data was hand collected (475 
observations were missing). In populating this table, I relied on the assumption that the individuals are able to become 
partner after 10 years of accounting experience. This assumption seems reasonable as the average number of years is 
9.55 years for Years Partner observations where the data is non-missing. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection and Distribution by Year 
 
 
 
 
  61 
 
 
 61 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by OMP Change Type and Period Relative to the 
Change 
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TABLE 4 
OMP Changes and Non-audit Fees 
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TABLE 5 
OMP Changes and Audit Fees 
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TABLE 6 
OMP Changes and Going Concern Reporting 
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TABLE 7 
OMP Changes and Restatements 
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TABLE 8 
OMP Changes and Discretionary Accruals 
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TABLE 9 
OMP Change Prediction Models 
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